The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted Facts
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#46: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted F Author: C_Sherman PostPosted: Thu Aug 03, 2006 3:09 pm
    ----
- Neil_Baumgardner


The 3-1 defense advantage rule is a rule of hand that dates back to Clausewitz, which can be adjusted to the particulars of any situation and may or may not have any validity. I will grant defense probably does have advantage, but whether its 2-1, 3-1, etc can vary... OTOH, there certainly have been many thinkers & generals, Patton may have been one of them, that believed in offensive advantage.



The 3-1 rule is, as you say, a rule of hand. However, it has been validated many times over in actual combat, and remains an accepted rule in military planning. It can be adjusted based on the preparation of the defense and other factors, but most often it is adjusted upwards rather than downwards. In urban terrain, the ratio is significantly larger, with the advantage to the defender. For the Allies in NWE, I would say higher is more likely, based on Allies unfamiliarity with terrain, German preparation time, and other advantages held by defending Germans.

Patton's belief in offensive advantage had nothing to do with invalidating the 3-1 rule, but spoke rather to a way of avoiding the engagement. His thesis, still in current use by the US Army (among others), is that speed in the offense will deny the enemy the opportunity to prepare a defense, and creates opportunities to avoid defensive battles altogether. Controlled speed and decisive action preserve initiative and freedom of action to the attacker, allowing him to set the time and place of the fight. Thus, it negates the 3-1 advantage of the defender by avoiding the defensive "fair fight". The advantage remains, it just doesn't apply.

However, this offensive advantage applies more at the operational level of warfare (Division and above), which was of course Patton's domain. Below that, the ebb and flow of the battlefield will inevitably result in attacks against a prepared defender, whether we want it to or not. The overall principle of offensive speed may still apply, but at some level the attacker still has to "take that hill".

Since the ratios in question are at that lowest tactical level, where a single tank or platoon of tanks stands in the way of the advance, Patton's offensive advantage is less applicable and the 3-1 rule will dominate the action. Changes in these advantages may certainly be debated, but experience shows that 3-1 is on average correct.

C


Last edited by C_Sherman on Thu Aug 03, 2006 3:46 pm; edited 1 time in total

#47: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted F Author: Doug_KibbeyLocation: The Great Satan PostPosted: Thu Aug 03, 2006 3:23 pm
    ----
Further to Chuck's excellent points, a lot of the advantage to offensive operations when not avoiding the stronger defensive postions altogether, is the ability to concentrate one's forces (exercising "initiative", as Chuck mentioned) at the place of the attacker's choosing. By doing so, the attacker can assemble a numerical ratio equal to or greater than the theoretical one attributed to the defender.

#48: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted F Author: Neil_BaumgardnerLocation: Arlington, VA PostPosted: Thu Aug 03, 2006 4:05 pm
    ----
- C_Sherman
- Neil_Baumgardner


The 3-1 defense advantage rule is a rule of hand that dates back to Clausewitz, which can be adjusted to the particulars of any situation and may or may not have any validity. I will grant defense probably does have advantage, but whether its 2-1, 3-1, etc can vary... OTOH, there certainly have been many thinkers & generals, Patton may have been one of them, that believed in offensive advantage.



The 3-1 rule is, as you say, a rule of hand. However, it has been validated many times over in actual combat, and remains an accepted rule in military planning. It can be adjusted based on the preparation of the defense and other factors, but most often it is adjusted upwards rather than downwards. In urban terrain, the ratio is significantly larger, with the advantage to the defender. For the Allies in NWE, I would say higher is more likely, based on Allies unfamiliarity with terrain, German preparation time, and other advantages held by defending Germans.

Patton's belief in offensive advantage had nothing to do with invalidating the 3-1 rule, but spoke rather to a way of avoiding the engagement. His thesis, still in current use by the US Army (among others), is that speed in the offense will deny the enemy the opportunity to prepare a defense, and creates opportunities to avoid defensive battles altogether. Controlled speed and decisive action preserve initiative and freedom of action to the attacker, allowing him to set the time and place of the fight. Thus, it negates the 3-1 advantage of the defender by avoiding the defensive "fair fight". The advantage remains, it just doesn't apply.

However, this offensive advantage applies more at the operational level of warfare (Division and above), which was of course Patton's domain. Below that, the ebb and flow of the battlefield will inevitably result in attacks against a prepared defender, whether we want it to or not. The overall principle of offensive speed may still apply, but at some level the attacker still has to "take that hill".

Since the ratios in question are at that lowest tactical level, where a single tank or platoon of tanks stands in the way of the advance, Patton's offensive advantage is less applicable and the 3-1 rule will dominate the action. Changes in these advantages may certainly be debated, but experience shows that 3-1 is on average correct.
C


Chuck, very good points. As a student of military history & analysis, I'm impressed. Only counterpoint or question I would make is that at what point does offensive advantage at the operational level filter or "trickle" down to tactical advantage?

Neil

#49: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted F Author: mkenny PostPosted: Thu Aug 03, 2006 7:28 pm
    ----
If you persist there are some very good figures in this thread.

www.feldgrau.net/phpBB...sc&start=0




For Normandy the following extract is illuminating:



"It is very difficult to determine the ‘exchange’ ratios in terms of effectiveness between two opposing weapons systems, even in a generalized sense. And the ‘ratios’ bandied about in this case are simply not relative measure of effectiveness, but rather they are relative measures of loss, which are not the same thing. In other words, if the Allies lost 300 tanks and the Germans 100, then a 3-to-1 loss ratio exists. But that does not mean that there was a 3-to-1 ratio of effectiveness. However, if we could know that that 100 Allied tanks were lost to German tanks and 100 German tanks were lost to Allied tanks, then we possibly could say that there was a 1-to-1 ratio of relative effectiveness between them. Unfortunately, as in some many cases of such historical analysis, the data simply can’t support such a conclusion one way or another and can be manipulated virtually any way one desires - all in quite a reasonable and logical manor.

Overall cause of loss for tanks varies according to time period and the reports cited. Thus, according to WO 291/1186 in the ETO it was:

Mines 22.1%
AT guns 22.7%
Tanks 14.5%
SP Guns 24.4%
Bazooka 14.2%
Other 2.1%

This may be compared to a sample of 506 US First Army tanks lost (destroyed and damaged) between 6 June and 30 November 1944.

Mines 18.2%
AT/Tank guns 46.2%
Artillery 7.3%
Mortars 1.8%
Bazooka 13.6%
Other 12.9%

Now as far as American tank losses in Normandy go we have the following data from various reports:

In terms of the cause of loss, in June of 32 tanks examined, 18 were to ‘AT guns’ (56.25%), 9 to PF/PS (28.13%), 1 to mines (3.13%), and 1 to ‘artillery’ (3.13%). Unfortunately we do not know if the AT guns were just that or if they were mounted on armored vehicles of some type. However, we do know that 6 of those 18 were lost on D-Day, so cannot have been lost to anything other than the emplaced guns of the beach defenses.

In July, of 73 examined, 41.1% were lost to AT guns, 32.88% to PF/PS, 16.44% to mines, 4.11% to mines and 4.11% to unknown causes.

In August, of 130 examined, 55.38% were lost to AT guns, 18.46 to unknown causes, 13.08% to mines, 6.15% to artillery, 5.38% to PF/PS, and 1.54% to mortars.

Overall, losses to ‘AT guns’ appear to have been somewhere around 50% in Normandy (the monthly average is 50.91%) and were not far off the ‘norm’ of 46.2%.

From 6 June to 1 July (26 days), First Army wrote off 187 M4-75mm and 44 M5.
From 2 to 29 July (28 days), First Army wrote off 208 M4-75mm, 12 M4-76mm, 4 M4-105mm, and 67 M5.
From 30 July to 2 September (35 days), First Army wrote off 237 M4-75mm, 38 M4-76mm, 6 M4-105mm, and 69 M5.
From 3 to 28 September (26 days), First Army wrote off 123 M4-75mm, 33 M4-76mm, 10 M4-105mm, and 34 M5.
From 1 August to 2 September (33 days), Third Army wrote off 221 M4-75mm and 94 M5.
From 3 to 30 September (28 days), Third Army wrote off 48 M4-75mm, 61 M4-76mm, 2 M4-105mm, and 37 M5.
From 9 September to 5 October (27 days), Ninth Army wrote off 2 M4-75mm.

Thus roughly:
‘June’ 231
‘July’ 291
‘August’ 665
‘September’ 350
Total = 1,537

From the above we could presume that roughly 780 were due to tank and AT guns. Using the WO figures, then perhaps 223 were to 'tank guns.'

For the British cause of loss in Normandy we have but a single document that appears relevant. That is O.R.S. 2 Report No. 12, Analysis of 75mm Sherman Tank Casualties Suffered Between 6th June and 10th June 1944. That document reports that of 45 Sherman tanks examined a total of 40 or 89% were lost to ‘AP shot,’ 4 or 9% to mines and 1 or 2% to unidentified causes.

British losses are given as:

June – 146
July – 231
August – 834
September - ?
Total = 1,211 (est. 1,568)

Unfortunately I have been unable to determine the British September totals, but given the overall similarity with the American figures it is probably not unreasonable to suppose that they were about 350 as well (if the proportionality with June-August were maintained, then it would be 357. If we presume that the above cause of loss was consistent for June and July, then about 336 were probably lost to ‘AP shot,’ which is probably an underestimate. If we presume that percentage applied throughout, then a total of 1,396 were possibly lost to ‘AP shot,’ which is probably an exaggeration. Using the total ‘AP shot’ weapons from WO 292/1186 (61.6) we would probably derive a more accurate estimate of 966. On the other hand, if we accept the figures from WO 291/1186 by type of AP weapon, then we can estimate that only 227 were lost to ‘tank guns’ and if that figure is applied to the Allied total loss, then perhaps only 450 were lost to ‘tank guns.’

Thus, we may estimate that the upper limit of Allied tanks lost to ‘AP shot’ (tanks, AT guns and assault guns) was perhaps 2,176, while probably the lower limit lost to ‘tank guns’ was about 450.

German losses were:

June – 1 Pz-IV(k), 124 Pz-IV(l), 80 Pz-V, 19 Pz-VI (L56) = 224
July – 149 Pz-IV(l), 125 Pz-V, 14 Pz-VI (L56) = 288
August – 49 Pz-IV(l), 41 Pz-V, 15 Pz-VI (L56) = 105
September – 12 Pz-IV(k), 581 Pz-IV, 540 Pz-V, 72 Pz-VI (L56), 23 Pz-VI (L70) = 1,228
Total = 1,845

Cause of loss for German tanks is given for a select set in O.R.S. 2 Report No. 17, Analysis of German Tank Casualties in France, 6th June 44 – 31st August 1944. In that report, for the period of 6 June-7 August a sample of 53 tanks resulted in 48% lost to ‘AP shot.’ For 8-31 August 1944 that dropped to just 11% due to the high number of abandoned tanks in that period. From that we may presume that the June-July total loss to ‘AP shot’ may have been about 246, while for August-September it may have been about 147, for a total of about 393.

Thus, using these very rough methods, we can assume that the upper limit of the ratio of Allied to German tank losses to ‘AP shot’ may have been as high as 2,176-to-393, or about 5.54-to-1. Probably closer would be an ‘AP shot’ ratio of roughly 1,746-to-393, or about 4.44-to-1. The tank-versus-tank ratios are possibly similar although it could be argued to be as low as 673-to-393, or 1.71-to-1, aboutthe same as the overall loss ratio. Nevermind that this comparison is probably irrelevent.

Overall then we may postulate a total of about 3,105 Allied to 1,845 German tanks written off, or about a 1.68-to-1 ratio of losses, again, a number that has nothing to do with the relative effectiveness of the Allied versus the German tanks. However, it is probably very relevant in terms of the overall Allied-versus-German combat effectiveness.

Of course the real upshot is that these comparisons are probably not very illuminating, nor very surprising, given that the Germans were fighting mostly on the tactical defensive, with tanks that were in general more effective than Allied types.
-----------------------------------------------------------------

So much for the 5:1 loss ratio for Allied tanks!

#50: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted F Author: Neil_BaumgardnerLocation: Arlington, VA PostPosted: Thu Aug 03, 2006 8:16 pm
    ----
Interesting info mkenny. This is somewhat as I expected. The only way to get a real true measure would be from unit records (rather than inspections of damage afterwards), but I suspect tank crews may not have recorded kills quite as much as pilots do... The Germans probably did - since they had more focus on "tank aces," but that only gives you half the numbers...

Neil

#51: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted F Author: C_Sherman PostPosted: Thu Aug 03, 2006 9:00 pm
    ----
- Neil_Baumgardner


Chuck, very good points. As a student of military history & analysis, I'm impressed. Only counterpoint or question I would make is that at what point does offensive advantage at the operational level filter or "trickle" down to tactical advantage?

Neil


Hi again Neil,

Your question found the seam between the science and "art" of warfare! The answer is also the key to "modern" manuever warfare.

The offensive advantage exists down to the tactical level, in a very dynamic way (dynamic, in the sense of rapid interactive and interdependant changes). The effect can be very localized, and depends greatly on the relative capabilities of the players. Basically, the offensive advantage comes from being "inside the decision cycle" of the adversary, acting before or while they react to your previous actions. Flexible, mentally nimble leaders are key to attaining this advantage, in addition to equipment that can support them.

The advantage comes when the attacker retains the initiative, and manuevers to bypass or overwhelm specific points in the defenders' arrangements.

By being where the Germans were not, or turning a flank, or focussing overwhelming force at a weak point, before the Germans could react or move their own forces, the Allies could achieve this advantage and avoid the attack against prepared defense. The Sherman actually fed this advantage for the Allies, by being faster than the German defenders could. That they did not always exploit this ability says more about the leadership than it does about the tanks and other vehicles the Allies employed.

In the defense, eliminating the advantage requires agile command and control systems and leadership, as well as mobility to counter the attackers' moves. The faster the attacker can adjust or shift effort, the more agile and responsive the defender must be.

The Germans were at a general disadvantage in the defense, most of the time. Arguably, their command and leadership was not as systemically reactive, both at the operational level (Hitler being the final authority for moving divisions), and at the tactical level. Their command and control systems were damaged and fragmented, and their tactical intelligence picture was largely incomplete. A subtle psychological handicap occurred because the Germans were accustomed to reacting to their own slower, less mechanized equipment in training. This meant that the Germans were often incapable of reacting in a timely way to Allied actions, even when those actions appeared ploddingly slow on the surface. So the Allies often achieved the offensive advantage, not always intentionally.

As currently executed by the users of the Abrams/Challenger2/Leo6-class militaries, speed and agility is a cornerstone of tactical operations. Historical narratives of the Gulf War and emerging histories of the Iraq War make it clear that the rapid actions in the attack left defenders befuddled, confused and vulnerable. Current efforts to digitalize combat vehicles and even individual soldiers are not just "gee whiz, because we can", they are designed to shorten the decision cycle even further. This serves well in the offense, and will serve to negate the offensive advantage in the defense.

Whew. Somebody please tell me all this makes sense? (See what happens when you get me going?)

C

#52: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted F Author: Roy_A_LingleLocation: El Paso & Ft Bliss, Texas PostPosted: Fri Aug 04, 2006 12:14 am
    ----
HI Chuck! Hi Folks!

- C_Sherman

Whew. Somebody please tell me all this makes sense? (See what happens when you get me going?)


It makes sense to me! Smile
I think all that was once known as the advantage of the element of surpise.

Possible an example of your post would be the Frence during 1940. They had the best tanks in Europe at the beginning of 1940, but by the end of that year, all those tanks were destoryed or being put to use by the Germans. The Germans got inside the Frence leadership desicion cycle and the rest is history.

I think that is also an example of one can not just take one AFV and compair it's spec.s to another. Two tanks facing off at high noon on main street doesn't happien very often.

Well done everyone!

HF, you still here?
The sound bits of TV show many times leave a lot of the story out. Do you have any questions now?

Some little items:
From Steve J. Zaloga's The M4 Sherman at War, The Europena Theatre 1942-1945, page 31.
"One US tank battalion was equipment with Fireflys in Italy, but received them too late to see combat action."

From R.P. Hunnicutt's Sherman book, page 213.
"On 9 August (1944), General Omar Bradley directed his Twelfth Army Group, Armor Section to request an allotment of tanks armed with the British 17 pounder."

Didn't happien due to a shortage of reserve tanks.

"The effort to obtain 17 pounder tanks was revivied later in the middle of February 1945..."
...the Twelfth Army Group requested an initail conversion of 160 Shermans with further conversions dependent on battle experience. Later, this was cut to 80 because of limitations in the British ammunition supply. .....only the first few began to arrive in mid March (1945). These were allocated to the Ninth Army, but there is no record of their use prior to the end of the war. In fact, the Ninth Army After Action Report indicates that the delivery of 40 17 pounders tanks was expected, but it does not record their arrival."

Some notes on Pershing numbers, all from Hunnicutt's Pershing book.
Production of the T-23E3 started during the fall of 1944.
20 of the first 40 vehicles completed shipment to Antwerp, Belgium in January of 1945.
All assigned to 12th U.S. Army Group, They were past along to 1st U.S. Army, with ten each going to the 3rd and 9th Armored Divisions.
February 25th (1945) 3RD AD was ready and the 9th AD was ready three days later.

Late March (1945) 40 more arrived, going to Ninth Army with 22 to the 2nd AD and the other 18 going to the 5th AD. The 2nd AD tankers received a 45 minute briffing and then move out with their new tanks.
30 issued to the 11th AD which started operations on Apirl 21 (1945).

"The flow of Pershings to Europe continued until by VE Day there were 310 in the Theater of whch 200 had been issued to the troops." Page 38.

What does all this tell us? Once the first problem of 'Doctrine' was starting to be over come, this was the best that could be done to get 17 pounder Shermans and T-23E3 90mm gun tanks into the hands of the troops.

Someone made a comment about the Soviets did a better job of upgrading their tanks than the U.S. did.

Soviets who had been working on tank designs during the 1930s had a head start over the U.S. Army which was impacted by a shortage of funds during that time.

I think that same poster also said that the Germans did a better job of upgrading and designing tanks. Will, the Germans were forced to. They ran into the T-34 and the KV-1 tanks the Soviets where just starting to field at the start of the Eastern Front war. They saw that both better tanks and AT Gun systems were needed to counter those Soviet Tanks.

The Soviets in turn were forced to up grade their tanks to counter the newer German tanks.

The U.S. on the other hand, was still working under a bad doctrine that prevented heavier tanks being developed and fielded. Until post D-Day, the U.S. was also working under the false believe that the 76mm tank cannon could do the job. Intell and after actions reports being received back in the states from actions in North Africa and Italy supported the believe that the doctrine (with more towed and less self propelled anti-tank units) could get the job done.

I feel that all the technical problems (and they were many and they are all very real) are just smoke screens reasons for not changing the doctrine.

Sgt, Scouts Out! Smile

#53: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted F Author: Neil_BaumgardnerLocation: Arlington, VA PostPosted: Fri Aug 04, 2006 1:42 am
    ----
- C_Sherman

Hi again Neil,

Your question found the seam between the science and "art" of warfare! The answer is also the key to "modern" manuever warfare.

The offensive advantage exists down to the tactical level, in a very dynamic way (dynamic, in the sense of rapid interactive and interdependant changes). The effect can be very localized, and depends greatly on the relative capabilities of the players. Basically, the offensive advantage comes from being "inside the decision cycle" of the adversary, acting before or while they react to your previous actions. Flexible, mentally nimble leaders are key to attaining this advantage, in addition to equipment that can support them.


Very good points. This is where the Air Force's OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop comes from as well as the Army's "See First, Understand First, Act First & Finish Decisively."

However, having just taken a class of History of Military Operations from a real Clausewitz disciple, I can tell you this is anethema to a traditional Clausewitzian view (and possibly derided as Jominian) - although I think it can fit within Clausewitz...

Of course Clausewitz also argued that good military leaders should NOT be students of history (he seemed to believe you were either a military genius or you werent) and that weather "rarely plays a factor." Tell the latter to Napoleon (1812) & Hitler (1942)....


The advantage comes when the attacker retains the initiative, and manuevers to bypass or overwhelm specific points in the defenders' arrangements.

By being where the Germans were not, or turning a flank, or focussing overwhelming force at a weak point, before the Germans could react or move their own forces, the Allies could achieve this advantage and avoid the attack against prepared defense. The Sherman actually fed this advantage for the Allies, by being faster than the German defenders could. That they did not always exploit this ability says more about the leadership than it does about the tanks and other vehicles the Allies employed.

In the defense, eliminating the advantage requires agile command and control systems and leadership, as well as mobility to counter the attackers' moves. The faster the attacker can adjust or shift effort, the more agile and responsive the defender must be.

The Germans were at a general disadvantage in the defense, most of the time. Arguably, their command and leadership was not as systemically reactive, both at the operational level (Hitler being the final authority for moving divisions), and at the tactical level. Their command and control systems were damaged and fragmented, and their tactical intelligence picture was largely incomplete. A subtle psychological handicap occurred because the Germans were accustomed to reacting to their own slower, less mechanized equipment in training. This meant that the Germans were often incapable of reacting in a timely way to Allied actions, even when those actions appeared ploddingly slow on the surface. So the Allies often achieved the offensive advantage, not always intentionally.

As currently executed by the users of the Abrams/Challenger2/Leo6-class militaries, speed and agility is a cornerstone of tactical operations. Historical narratives of the Gulf War and emerging histories of the Iraq War make it clear that the rapid actions in the attack left defenders befuddled, confused and vulnerable. Current efforts to digitalize combat vehicles and even individual soldiers are not just "gee whiz, because we can", they are designed to shorten the decision cycle even further. This serves well in the offense, and will serve to negate the offensive advantage in the defense.


Bingo, just what I was talking about above.


Whew. Somebody please tell me all this makes sense? (See what happens when you get me going?)
C


Certainly, and I have enjoyed it. I guess my point/question is, with the US (or at least Patton) often employing this form of warfare, how often did it negate the Germans' defensive tactical advantage? You said the Germans were at a general disadvantage on the defense, does this mean they usually did not enjoy a 3-1 advantage? If so, were any "kill-ratios" that remained due to the differing capabilities of the forces/tanks, instead of defensive advantage?

Neil

#54: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted F Author: Howard_Thompson PostPosted: Fri Aug 04, 2006 2:07 am
    ----
Albert Speer, Nazi Minister of Armaments 1942-1945 writes in his memoirs
"Inside the Third Reich" 1969

"In October 1944, I tried once more to win Hitler over to the idea of light tanks: On the southwestern front (Italy) reports on the cross-county mobility of the Sherman have bveen very favorable. The Sherman climbs mountains which our tank experts consider inaccessible to tanks. One great advantage is that the Sherman has a very powerful motor in proportion to its weight. Its cross-country mobility on level ground (in the Po Valley) is, as the Twenty-Sixth Division reports, definitely superior to that of our tanks. Everyone involved in tank warfare is impatiently waiting for lighter and therfore more maneuverable tanks which, simply by having superior guns, will assure the necessary fighting power.

#55: Re: The Sherman Tank, The Good, The Bad, and The Distorted Facts Author: Roy_A_LingleLocation: El Paso & Ft Bliss, Texas PostPosted: Fri Aug 04, 2006 10:22 am
    ----
Hi Neil! Hi Folks!

I copied this from that mess I used to start this thread.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neil_Baumgardner Joined: Jan 24, 2006 Posts: 507
Posted: Tue Aug 01, 2006 2:13 am Post subject: Re: 1st Cav Museum at Ft Hood...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neil wrote:
Bob, I'll play devil's advocate for the sake of discussion...

The heavier Panther-class tanks could have been offloaded using LSTs no?

Yes, but I don't think very many LSTs would have been available for that. The time frame for available LSTs in the MTO had a big impacted on the Anzio landings do to the need to transfered all of them to England for Overlord. Then they needed to be transfered back to the MTO for the landings in Southern France, followed by another transfer to the PTO.

Any movement of M6 or other heavier tanks could only have been done by the Liberties and other types of cargo ships. As it was, the first design of the Liberties could not even load or unload the early M4 Shermans. Some time during the war, only the cranes by the hold right in front of the bridge was upgraded to lift Shermans.

Part of the delay with the 12 T-23E3s that were shipped to the PTO was the problem with getting them off the ship after it arrived.

My 2 cents on using LSTs.
Sgt, Scouts Out! Smile



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