Com-Central.net

Maple_Leaf_Eh · ***Power User*** Offline Joined: Jan 24, 2006 Posts: 517

I have been following the OSINT (open source Int) on Lebanon, and have come to a few conclusions.

The 155 gun lines made up most of the video the IDF allowed. Some shots of guys standing on their Merkavas and T55 APCs, manouevering them in leaguers, shots of tired infantry, rising plumes from aircraft bombing, and the odd HUD footage. Maybe some missile smoke trails going into Israel. Distinctly absent was any combat footage. The only intriguing image I saw was of an Anti Tank hit on a Merkava. Dust and smoke and a few guys jumping out.

Then, in the Tuesday Ottawa is a story from The Daily Telegraph of captured Russian-made, Syrian-contract Kornet AT missiles and AT-5 Spandrels, possibly Iranian copies. The story concludes with remarks that the sophisticated AT weapons are believed to have accounted for many of the 116 IDF fatalities, and how there was a carefully prepared network of concealed ambush sites waiting for the IDF as it advanced.

Would anyone care to jump in with links or other stories.

Neil_Baumgardner

Have the Israelis claimed they were Kornet missiles, or just the media?

Remember, there were erroneous reports of Kornet-E missiles in Iraq during the initial combat ops of OIF - the Abrams in question turned out to have been hit in the rear by "friendly" 25mm fire from a Bradley...

Neil

Maple_Leaf_Eh · ***Power User*** Offline Joined: Jan 24, 2006 Posts: 517

The story is based around the IDF capture of GHANDOURIYEH, east of TYRE on Sunday night and the display of weapons by the IDF. At least 24 IDF soldiers were killed in the advance. Outside of one of the two mosques was a red van with 8 1.8m long green casings, identifiable by their seial numbers as Spandrels (how is not explained). In a garden in the eastern part of the village was an outpost with eight Kornets abandoned by Hezbollah, and described by the Brig. Mickey Edelstein, commander of the Nahal toops. The markings on the casings were described as:
"(contract number)
Customer: Ministry of Defence of Syria.
Supplier" KBP, Tula, Russia."

English was the default marking on Iraqi weapons and equipment and Jordanian ammo boxes I saw in Kuwait City in '91. So English on Arab contracts is not unusual.

LavTech · ***Power User*** Offline Joined: Jan 25, 2006 Posts: 11

This is a little long, sorry about that !, but it is somewhat informative regarding Missile attacks against IDF tanks.
It's from Jane's Defence

Key Points:

* The IDF has encountered a wide array of ATGMs since its incursion into south Lebanon, including the Kornet-E 9P133, Metis-M 9M131, the 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 'Spandrel') and the 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 'Spigot')

* More than 20 IDF personnel have been killed by ATGMs since the start of the conflict

An arsenal of advanced Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) is emerging as the most effective weapon being deployed by the Islamic Resistance's (the military wing of the Lebanese Shi'ite Party of God - Hizbullah) against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

"It is the most extensive encounter between Israeli armour and Russian-made ATGMs since the October 1973 war," retired brigadier general Avigdor Klein, a recent chief armour officer in the Israel Defence Force (IDF), told Jane's.

The IDF has encountered a wide array of ATGMs since its incursion into south Lebanon.
These include the Kornet-E 9P133, claimed to be able to penetrate 1-1.2 m of armour protected by explosive reactive armour (ERA); the Metis-M 9M131, equipped with a tandem high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warhead; the 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) and the 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 'Spigot') ATGMs.

"This massive supply of ATGMs reaffirms our concerns that advanced Russian weapons sold to Syria were forwarded to Hizbullah," a senior Israeli defence source told Jane's. Iran manufactures its own version of the Konkurs, the Towsan-1/M113 and has also developed improved versions of the 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 'Sagger') under the local name of Raad, both of which have surfaced with Hizbullah in Lebanon.

During the first month of fighting, 13 IDF armour personnel were killed by ATGM hits on Israel's most protected main battle tanks (MBTs); the Merkava Mk 2, 3, and 4.

"To put it in perspective," said a senior IDF source, "out of more than 500 ATGMs fired at us in the first month of fighting, only some 40 tanks sustained hits, with 10 being penetrated."

IDF commanders defined the Russian ATGMs as their "most dangerous challenge" in the fighting. "We are paying a heavy price to the ATGMs," admitted Major General Udi Adam, head of the IDF's Northern Command.

Several senior IDF sources have expressed disappointment in the IDF's decision to defer the procurement of Rafael Armament Development Authority's Trophy armour protection system (APS), which they believe could have turned the odds in the fighting.
"When we designed the Merkava Mk 4, we realised that the ERA is not sufficient to protect from advanced Russian ATGMs and that's why the Mk 4 was designed to carry an APS," said Klein, who is currently employed by Rafael.

"The Mk 4 provides excellent protection from all missiles in most of the tank's sectors, but some sectors are vulnerable to the advanced missiles. "An APS such as the Trophy could have defeated all ATGM threats," claimed another defence source. "Moreover, it would have required the designers of ATGMs to develop a whole new concept for anti-tank missiles."

IDF field commanders echo these claims. "The decision not to acquire an APS was simply a matter of wrong priorities. It could have completely changed the pace of our advancement in Lebanon and save lives," said Gen Adam.

"Nonetheless, if it wasn't for the high level of protection inherent in the Merkava design, the results could have been worse. You have to recognise how many lives the Merkavas' armour have saved."

While Hizbullah anti-tank teams appear well-trained and familiar with the MBTs weak spots, some of their successful hits are attributed to the tactics employed by the IDF in the first weeks of the fighting.

"Most of the armoured units were deployed on rescue and covering missions, rather than leading a wide offensive," said Klein. "This is contradictory to the IDF armour doctrine and unnecessarily exposed the tanks to the missiles.

"The small formations used to take over the small south Lebanese villages were unsuited for the threat," he added. "Employing the right tactics could significantly reduce the number of tanks hit.

"We were attacked by hundreds of ATGMs," Colonel Amnon Asulin, commander of the IDF's Sa'ar Armoured Brigade 7, told Jane's.

"These were young troops who were sent there, inexperienced in that kind of warfare, but as they are gaining experience and become familiar with the terrain they also adapt and improve their tactics."

"We were amazed by the vast quantity of weapons that we've discovered and encountered in Lebanon," said Gen Adam, "but we are becoming more efficient at dealing with them."

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli armour was surprised by the quantity and efficiency of Egyptian and Syrian anti-tank teams, equipped with Russian-made Sagger ATGMs, which caused severe damage to hundreds of tanks.

"Hizbullah is not the same kind of surprise," said Gen Adam. "It only requires some adaptation from us."

At the same time, Israel is launching a diplomatic effort to stop Russian arms sales to Syria. "For years, we have been warning the Russians that their weapons would end up in the hands of Hizbullah, while they claimed to be selling arms only to responsible states," a senior diplomatic source told Jane's. "This has clearly proved to be false."

Roy_A_Lingle

Hi Folks!

I think the 155 units showing up on news reports was because that was as far forward as the IDF was letting reporters go. I remember one CNN report done by a In-bedded reporter who was part of a combat raid. He claimed that was the first time the IDF had ever done that. I guess it may have been the only time it was done.

One thing I noticed was a lot of the Merkavas didn't have the passive armor on the turrets. I think I did see ONE, and only one Merkava with a Trophy armour protection system (APS) and that was last week during the count down to the cease fire. I am suprise to hear that the IDF didn't buy the Trophy APS system for their vehicles. I guess that is another one of those cases of not enough funds for everything.

My first impression is that the Hizbullah emplaced a wide area ambush for armored forces and did a fare job of pulling it off during the first few weeks.

My first impression is the IDF tried to relie on RPV recon drones to much in an effort to reduce their losses. In the long term, it didn't work as well as them though it would. Troop losses were higher that they were willing to pay and a lot of very bad press was made available to support the Hizbullah.

I think this latest round of combat between a conventional heavy military force and a light infantry force will need a lot of study. I also think the Hizbullah fighters did a much better job of holding ground that most folks though they should have been able to do.

In a number of ways, that fight reminds me of the battles between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese kamikazes during the last year of the Pacific war. Sad

My 2 cents on just the military points. Confused

Sgt, Scouts Out!

C_Sherman · ***Power User*** Offline Joined: Jan 24, 2006 Posts: 590

I remember hearing (on the radio, from a former IDF officer) that Hizbollah was using ATGMs for all sorts of things not related to killing tanks. Apparently, they would shoot them at stuff as minor as one Israeli soldier moving across a hilltop. The point to this was that they had used a tremendous number of missiles, and that Syria and Iran were likely to experience considerable fiscal pain to replace the large amount of ordnance that Hizbollah had expended.

I suppose we'll see how true that really is, over the next few years.

buglerbilly · ***Power User*** Offline Joined: Jan 24, 2006 Posts: 147

The point to this was that they had used a tremendous number of missiles, and that Syria and Iran were likely to experience considerable fiscal pain to replace the large amount of ordnance that Hizbollah had expended.

With Oil at what $70+ per barrel, I doubt whether Iran could give a damn especially when they perceive themselves as having the ability to "humiliate" Israel and hence the USA without suffering anything more than the loss of some money which they will replace in what? A week or so?

The fact that Arabs are dying and not Persians just adds to the irony of it all.

Regards,

BUG

buglerbilly · ***Power User*** Offline Joined: Jan 24, 2006 Posts: 147

Israel introspective after Lebanon offensive

An introspective account of the conflict by Alon Ben-David JDW Correspondent
Tel Aviv

You have to subscribe to get the full version, which I doubt I ever will NOT at their prices!!!

The Israeli government approved the launch of an aerial campaign against Hizbullah to achieve three goals: to create the conditions of return of the abductees; to damage Hizbullah's military capabilities; and to push the Lebanese government to accept UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and assume sovereignty in southern Lebanon.

The result, however, was an indecisive operation, which was conducted ad hoc rather than based on a comprehensive plan, and which revealed a series of flaws within the Israel Defence Force (IDF), including:

- The reserve army, the IDF's main ground force, was exposed in the campaign as an insufficiently trained and equipped force. Years of negligence, due to budgetary constraints, brought highly motivated but sometimes poorly equipped units into Lebanon. "We have been warning for years on the deterioration of the reserve army, through its lack of training," claimed Gen Halutz. There's a consensus among senior IDF officers that the reserves will have to undergo a significant upgrade effort.

- The anti-tank threat emerged as the most serious challenge to the IDF. Operating Kornet-E and Metis-M anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), Hizbullah successfully destroyed 14 Israeli Merkava Mk 2, 3 and 4 main battle tanks. In response, the Israeli MoD has ordered Rafael Armament Development Authority to accelerate preparations for production of its Trophy active protection system (APS) for future IDF procurement. Israel Military Industries has also been asked to complete development of its APS, dubbed Iron Fist, for IDF evaluation.

- Military intelligence provided information about Hizbullah capabilities, both in artillery rockets and in ATGMs. However, it was not able to provide the IDF with accurate intelligence on the whereabouts of Hizbullah's political and military leadership, which the IDF wished to target. Also, field commanders claimed, information on Hizbullah's ground alignment of tunnels and bunkers in southern Lebanon was insufficient.

The next round

Israel fears that Hizbullah's success in operating Syrian- and Iranian-supplied weapons could accelerate additional procurement of such systems and might encourage Syria to experiment with a military confrontation.

With Israel fearing that the recent conflict with Hizbullah will not be the last and could also mark the prelude for a future confrontation with Iran, calls are growing for a quick rehabilitation of the IDF to prepare it for what could be the "next round".

376 of 1,778 words

Ã‚Â© 2006 Jane's Information Group
[End of non-subscriber extract]

Regards,

BUG

Doug_Kibbey

- buglerbilly

- The reserve army, the IDF's main ground force, was exposed in the campaign as an insufficiently trained and equipped force. Years of negligence, due to budgetary constraints, brought highly motivated but sometimes poorly equipped units into Lebanon. "We have been warning for years on the deterioration of the reserve army, through its lack of training," claimed Gen Halutz. There's a consensus among senior IDF officers that the reserves will have to undergo a significant upgrade effort.

...and apparently, some reservists are "up in arms" about it, so to speak:

www.latimes.com/news/n...-headlines

(Read the full story at the link above)

"Israel Regroups on Approach to War Inquiry
The government pulls the plug on its panel while Olmert considers whether to heed calls for a broader probe. Troops push for resignations.
By Henry Chu, Times Staff Writer
August 23, 2006

JERUSALEM Ã¢â‚¬â€? After one day's work, the Israeli government suspended its review of the way it conducted the war in Lebanon, officials said Tuesday, as scores of reserve soldiers back from the fighting rallied here to press for the resignation of top political figures.

The Defense Ministry halted the work of its war review committee Monday to give Prime Minister Ehud Olmert more time to decide whether to authorize a fuller examination of Israel's monthlong air campaign and ground incursion against the Shiite Muslim militant group Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Calls for a more aggressive and independent inquiry have grown louder daily as anger here over what some call indecisive and incompetent wartime leadership has snowballed since a cease-fire took effect last week.

Some of the harshest criticism has come from military reservists, whose voices carry great weight in Israeli society. The veterans protesting in Jerusalem on Tuesday evening demanded that Olmert, his defense minister and the army's chief of staff step down.

The demonstrators accused the three of rushing into full-scale armed conflict without having adequately laid the military groundwork, and then of dithering over the war's objectives and how to realize them. That resulted in confusing and sometimes needlessly perilous orders on the ground, they said.

"The big heads should be the ones to go," said Yossi Avigor, 29, a reserve infantryman who spent two weeks fighting in western Lebanon. "They tried, they failed, they should go home."

Families of fallen soldiers, as well as civic groups upset by the state's treatment of northern Israelis who spent weeks under attack from Hezbollah rockets, also have castigated the nation's leaders. The opposition from so many quarters has presented Olmert's young government with its severest crisis in less than four months in power

buglerbilly · ***Power User*** Offline Joined: Jan 24, 2006 Posts: 147

Full report via a friend.............the losses are interesting (if that is the right term to use Crying or Very sad

)

JDW Aug 23, 2006
Posted: 18-Aug-2006

Israel introspective after Lebanon offensive

An introspective account of the conflict by ALON BEN-DAVID JDW Correspondent
Tel Aviv

As Israel started to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory on 17 August, there were growing calls from the Israeli public demanding an investigation of what is perceived as a series of failures in the current campaign.

Although the Israeli political and military leadership claim the goals of the offensive against the Islamic Resistance (the armed wing of the Lebanese Shi'ite Party of God - Hizbullah) were achieved in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, the majority of the Israeli public believes the Israel Defence Force (IDF) failed to obtain the objectives set for the operation.

In response to growing public pressure, and perhaps in an attempt to impede a public inquiry committee, Israeli Defence Minister Amir Peretz has established a commission of inquiry that will examine the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and IDF's conduct before and during the conflict.

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Dan Halutz has also indicated he intends to appoint an internal IDF inquiry. Internal inquiries can never scrutinise the officials who initiate them, however a public commission of inquiry bears the authority of the Israeli Supreme Court and examines performance and decision-making process at all levels.

While most of Israel's post-war inquiry committees tended to spare the political echelon and placed the onus on the military levels, it is clear in this instance why Israel's inexperienced prime minister and defence minister are reluctant to appoint such an inquiry, let alone the IDF Chief of Staff.

Gen Halutz came under severe public criticism after it was revealed that he had sold his entire stock portfolio just hours after the abduction of two IDF personnel on 12 July: a time when the IDF was preparing for war.

With the confidence of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Israeli Defence Minister Amid Peret's backing, Gen Halutz rejected accusations of misconduct, saying that he "like any other civilian, has a household to manage".

Aside from personal allegations, IDF soldiers now returning from Lebanon are revealing the inside stories of the conflict, shedding more than a shred of doubt on the IDF's readiness for the war and its conduct during the fighting.

"We are winning the war," Olmert declared several times in the last weeks of the conflict, but Israelis now appear to feel anything but victorious. However, both politicians and senior IDF commanders agree that Israel enjoyed unprecedented international support in the campaign, combined with a solid internal consensus, both of which underscore the question of the IDF's failure to achieve the campaign's objectives.

'Aerial dominance' failure

As recently as June, the IDF held an exercise based on a scenario in which an incident whereby Hizbullah kidnapped an IDF soldier quickly develops into a wide-scale conflict in Lebanon. During the exercise, the IDF launch a week-long air and land stand-off campaign against Hizbullah, as the Shi'ite militia respond with rocket attacks on Israeli towns. After a week of air strikes and artillery, the IDF launch a ground operation, with three divisions taking over southern Lebanon and beginning a four-week cleansing operation to destroy Hizbullah's presence in the area.

On 12 July that scenario materialised with the abduction of two IDF servicemen during patrol along the Lebanese border. The IDF immediately recommended a massive operation, which will "set Lebanon back 20 years" as Gen Halutz phrased it.

The Israeli government approved the launch of an aerial campaign against Hizbullah to achieve three goals: to create the conditions of return of the abductees; to damage Hizbullah's military capabilities; and to push the Lebanese government to accept UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and assume sovereignty in southern Lebanon.

The IDF, while translating the directive into an operational plan, added another objective: to strengthen Israel's deterrent image. From that moment on, reality departed the exercise's scenario and the IDF's standing plans for a conflict in Lebanon were never executed.

Israel launched an aerial campaign, which for the first two weeks did little to reduce the rain of rockets Hizbullah poured daily on Israeli towns. After two weeks, a local skirmish along the border drew two IDF brigades into a long bloody battle in the village of Marun Al-Ras and later to the town of Bint Jbeil. By the fourth week, three IDF divisions were operating in Lebanon, struggling against Hizbullah's first line of defence - the Nasser brigade. Only on the 29th day did the Israeli Cabinet approve the expansion of the operation, which was initiated on 11 August - just hours before the UN approved a ceasefire resolution.

On the 33rd day, 13 August, when the ceasefire took effect, Hizbullah was still active in southern Lebanon and capable of launching more than 200 rockets on Israel, while the IDF still could not control southern Lebanon.

"Up until the fourth week, the IDF had not recommended a wider ground operation," claims Olmert, insinuating that Gen Halutz was opting for an aerial campaign, believing that Israel's "aerial dominance" could subdue Hizbullah.

"I never said an aerial campaign would suffice to prevail," Gen Halutz claimed. "The original plan was to combine an aerial campaign with a ground manoeuvre."

The result, however, was an indecisive operation, which was conducted ad hoc rather than based on a comprehensive plan, and which revealed a series of flaws within the IDF, including:

The reserve army, the IDF's main ground force, was exposed in the campaign as an insufficiently trained and equipped force. Years of negligence, due to budgetary constraints, brought highly motivated but sometimes poorly equipped units into Lebanon. "We have been warning for years on the deterioration of the reserve army, through its lack of training," claimed Gen Halutz. There's a consensus among senior IDF officers that the reserves will have to undergo a significant upgrade effort.
The anti-tank threat emerged as the most serious challenge to the IDF. Operating Kornet-E and Metis-M anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), Hizbullah successfully destroyed 14 Israeli Merkava Mk 2, 3 and 4 main battle tanks (MBTs). In response, the Israeli MoD has ordered Rafael Armament Development Authority to accelerate preparations for production of its Trophy active protection system (APS) for future IDF procurement. Israel Military Industries (IMI) has also been asked to complete development of its APS, dubbed Iron Fist, for IDF evaluation.
The Israel Air Force (IAF) is considered to have been the most successful service in fulfiling its goals. With more than 10,000 fighter sorties, the IAF attacked more than 7,000 targets in Lebanon, initiating its new F-16I Soufa multirole fighters, which took significant part in the campaign. Based on accurate intelligence, the IAF is believed to have destroyed more than 50 per cent of Hizbullah's arsenal of long-range rockets in the first hour of the campaign. Striking storage facilities and launchers of the Zelzal 1 and 2, the Fajr 3 and 5, the Raad 1 and Khaibar 1 rockets, Hizbullah was capable of launching only several dozen longer-range rockets during the war. "Moreover, 90 per cent of long-range rocket launchers which fired were destroyed immediately after [launching their salvos]," a senior IAF source told Jane's. However, IDF field commanders have complained about insufficient air support during the ground battles, mostly of attack helicopters, as a result of the anti-aircraft missiles threat.
Military intelligence provided information about Hizbullah capabilities, both in artillery rockets and in ATGMs. However, it was not able to provide the IDF with accurate intelligence on the whereabouts of Hizbullah's political and military leadership, which the IDF wished to target. Also, field commanders claimed, information on Hizbullah's ground alignment of tunnels and bunkers in southern Lebanon was insufficient.
Rocket threats proved impossible to suppress from the air, nor was it easy from the ground. However this lesson is not new to Israel, which has been dealing with artillery rockets from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip for years. Nevertheless, Peretz has ordered a re-examination of potential protection systems, such as the Nautilus project - based on the Tactical High Energy Laser.
The Israel Navy (IN) suffered a severe blow in the war, with its Sa'ar 5 class flagship, INS Hanit, hit by an Iranian-made C-802 'Noor' anti-ship-guided missile. "The Hanit's multi-layered protection systems were not activated at the time of the attack as we were not aware of such threats in the Lebanese arena," a senior IN source told Jane's. While the Hanit did not sink, IN sources acknowledge that the incident could impact upon the IN's plans for future procurement of additional corvettes.
The IDF's Logistics Corps failed to supply some units inside Lebanon during the fighting with food, water and ammunition. "In some cases we couldn't secure a land route for supplies so we sought other ways, such as airlift supplies," said Major General Avi Mizrahi, Head of IDF Logistics Directorate. "We have found ourselves operating without a logistical tail," an IDF field commander told Jane's.

The next round

"We cannot ignore that some Arab countries consider Hizbullah's resistance to the IDF a success," a senior IDF source admitted. The IDF fears that the ongoing fighting by Hizbullah against IDF tanks and infantry in Lebanon's southern villages is perceived in the Arab world, particularly in Syria, as a sign of Israeli weakness.

"In this respect I cannot say we have deepened our deterrent image," added the source.

Indeed, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad praised Hizbullah for "defeating the Israeli Army" in a speech in Damascus on 15 August, pledging to "liberate the Golan Heights by our own hands". Attempting to circumvent IAF and armour superiority, Syria has for years invested in ATGMs instead of tanks, in surface-to-surface missiles, which could threaten the Israeli rear, and in surface-to-air missile systems that could challenge the IAF.

Israel fears that Hizbullah's success in operating Syrian- and Iranian-supplied weapons could accelerate additional procurement of such systems and might encourage Syria to experiment with a military confrontation.

With Israel fearing that the recent conflict with Hizbullah will not be the last and could also mark the prelude for a future confrontation with Iran, calls are growing for a quick rehabilitation of the IDF to prepare it for what could be the "next round".

The war in numbers

33 days of fighting
Israeli casualties: 119 servicemen, 41 civilians
Lebanese casualties: At least 900 civilians and 500 Hizbullah fighters
Rockets fired on Israel: 3,970
Israel Air Force sorties: 15,500
Targets struck in Lebanon: 7,000
Hizbullah rocket launchers destroyed: 126
Israeli MBTs destroyed: 20 (6 to mines and 14 to ATGMs - they were all Merkava Mk 2,3 or 4s)
IAF aircraft shot down: 1
IAF aircraft lost in accidents: 4
Israel Navy operational hours: 8,000
IDF Artillery shells fired: more than 100,000

Source: Israel Defence Force

Regards,

BUG

Hellfish6

Israel had an aircraft shot down?

mike_Duplessis · ***Power User*** Offline Joined: Jan 24, 2006 Posts: 236

Israel had a 'something' shot down. I saw the news footage. Something spiraling in flames from the sky over Beirut. Initial reports said F16. Later reports said drone.

14 tanks lost to ATGMs. Ouch.

Hellfish6

How many M-1s were lost in the invasion part of OIF1?

Com-Central.net

Select Language

Login

`±`Recent Visitors

`±`User Info-big

Com-Central.net

Select Language

Login

±Recent Visitors

±User Info-big

`±`Recent Visitors

`±`User Info-big